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I. INTRODUCTION
The Afghan/Pakistan frontier dispute is one of the
most difficult and long-standing problems to face the
international diplomatic and security community. The
frontier diving Afghanistan and Pakistan, (commonly known
as the “Durand Line” after the British Foreign Secretary of
India, Sir Mortimer Durand, who negotiated the creation of
the frontier with Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Afghanistan, in
1893) has been a scene of tension and instability in the region
since the time of British imperial rule in the 19th century.
Before Indian Independence in 1947 the frontier suffered a
series of violations at the hands of both sides. After 1947,
Afghanistan declared that it would not recognize the validity
of the line, a position which led to further stand-offs and
armed conflicts between Afghanistan and the new state of
Pakistan. The difficultly of governing the regions around the
frontier and the lack of Afghan-Pakistan co-operation over
the frontier (a result of the 1893 frontier settlement) was
instrumental in incubating the Afghan civil war of the 1990s,
the rise of the Taliban, and the continuing armed
insurrections which have faced both Afghanistan and
Pakistan since 2001. The failure of Afghanistan and Pakistan
to come to an agreement over the legal status of the frontier
has also been blamed for allowing the frontier regions to
harbor international terrorist groups, not to mention
hindering economic and social development in the regions
and the maintenance of basic human rights and the rule of
law. 1

1

See Bijan Omrani, The Durand Line: History and Problems of the AfghanPakistan Border, 40 J. OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y FOR ASIAN AFF., 177-195, (2009)
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This article will attempt to analyze the merits of the
competing claims of Afghanistan and Pakistan over the legal
status of the Durand Line and frontier territories. It will also
comment on what role a resolution of the legal dispute over
the frontier might play in a wider settlement of the longrunning problems of the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier.
I.

HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

The difficult geography of the region surrounding the
Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier [see map] made the area a
scene of conflict between competing powers long before the
development of any of the modern states. Historically, the
region of Afghanistan has been a frontier territory situated
between three competing centers of power – India, Persia
(Iran) and Central Asia. Empires based in these regions
extended their control into the region of Afghanistan and
pushed their frontiers back and forth there depending on the
waxing and waning of their relative strength. No stable
frontier ever crystallized between these three centers of
power because the geographical features available were never
sufficient to act as concrete lines of defense.

(where author has previously covered some historical and current affairs
aspects of the question); See also Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies,
Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending
Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (2010)
(discussing the problematic development and effects of international law
over the history of the frontier).
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This tendency is most clearly seen in the question of
where the north-western frontier of India should be placed.
The question was always on the mind of Indian rulers as India
suffered frequent invasions from the north-west (the only
viable land route for a hostile army to enter India). Geography
offers five possible options for a frontier, starting from the
furthest north [see map]:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

The River Oxus (Amu-Darya);
The Hindu Kush mountain range, from the
Pamir Mountains down to Herat or the deserts
in the south of Afghanistan;
The heights of the Suleiman-koh mountain
range;
The base of the foothills of the Suleiman-koh
mountain range;
The Indus River.
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Over the past 500 years, each of these options have
served as the north-western frontier of India. The Mughal
empire briefly attained the Oxus in the 16th century but then
reverted to the Hindu Kush. After the emergence of the first
incarnation of the Afghan state in 1747 – the Durrani Empire
– the frontiers were for a time pushed back as far as Kashmir.
By the beginning of the 1800s, when the Durrani Empire had
fallen into decline, the Sikh Kingdom of the Punjab controlled
much of the territory between the Indus River and the
Suleiman-koh foothills. 2
The Sikh Kingdom of the Punjab fell into British hands
after the end of the Second Anglo-Sikh War in 1849, and the
growing British Empire in India by then extended up to the
base of Suleiman-Koh foothills, but not into the mountainous
areas. 3
The British in India after this point faced two geopolitical problems. The first was whether to maintain the
frontier at that point, or whether to push it further north and
west for the defense of the Empire. The activities of the
Russian Empire at that period were causing concern to the
British. Russian power was growing in Central Asia, and
British officials feared that Russia in time would push its
territorial control southwards far enough to threaten British
India. These fears had originally led the British to attempt to
put a puppet king on the throne in Kabul during the first
Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42), an incident which ended in
failure for the British. British concern mounted throughout
the 19th century as Russia continued its advance through

See PERCY SYKES, A History of Afghanistan at 351-391 (1940).
See generally AMARPAL SINGH, The Second Anglo-Sikh War, AMBERLEY,
(2016).

2
3
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Central Asia, annexing large tracts of territory and the cities
of Tashkent (1869), Samarkand (1868), Bokhara (1869) and
Khiva (1878). 4
The second problem faced by the British was the
question of policing. Broadly speaking, the region of southern
Afghanistan and the Suleiman-koh Mountains and then to a
certain extent the regions east of the Suleiman-koh foothills
were (and still are) inhabited by the Pashtun tribal group. The
Pashtuns were a fissiparous grouping, divided into clans,
sub-clans and smaller units down to family groupings. The
way of life and level of economic development of the
Pashtuns at that time varied widely depending on the
geography of their immediate habitat. Some, particularly
those living around Kandahar were urbanized or involved in
sedentary agriculture. Some were able to prosper as nomadic
pastoralists who also oversaw the logistics of long-distance
caravan trade. Others, particularly those without access to
urban centers or scarce agricultural or grazing land, were
particularly poor.5
This was especially the case for the Pashtun hill tribes
living in the Suleiman-koh mountains. They were reliant on a
combination of subsidies from outsiders – usually the Afghan
government in Kabul – and raiding the more prosperous
settled districts in the neighboring plains to make a living. The
Pashtun Hill tribes by custom were extremely independent-

4

See MARTIN EWANS, Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics,
at 59-97, Harper Perennial, London, (2002).
5 See generally James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, THE HAGUE: MOUTON
& CO., (1963); see also Leon B. Poullada, ‘Pushtunistan: Afghan Domestic
Politics and Relations with Pakistan’, in A. T. Embree , Pakistan’s Western
Borderlands, at 131, NEW DELHI (1971).
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spirited and egalitarian in their way of life and customs. They
were unwilling to follow the laws and edicts of governments
in the settled districts, whether India or Kabul, and
maintained their own tribal customs, known as Pashtunwali
(‘The Way of the Pashtun’) as a form of unwritten common
law. Conspicuous parts of Pashtunwali included the
obligation to pursue vendettas in return for injuries or insults
against oneself or one’s tribal grouping. It also included an
absolute obligation to provide hospitality even for enemies or
fugitives from justice in the settled regions. As such, the
different hill tribes were frequently in conflict with each other,
but on top of this their pursuit of such laws made it almost
impossible for governments in the settled districts to reduce
them to obedience. 6
It should be noted that the subsidies from Kabul were
in reality little more than protection money to keep open the
trade routes into India; trade caravans were a particular target
of the Pashtun hill tribes. It was difficult for the Kabul
government ever to collect taxes from these regions, though
they would sometimes be able to enlist the help of the tribes
in support of the Kabul throne in times of difficulty. It should
also be noted that the Afghan state initially came into being
in 1747 as an Empire of Pashtuns, led by the Durrani tribal
grouping based around Kandahar. Thus, even though the
Pashtun Hill tribes behaved in an independent fashion, the
Pashtun-led Kabul government maintained a nominal claim

6 See Abdur Rauf Khan Khattack, Reforms to the Federally Administered Area
of Pakistan (FATA)-An Unresolved Problem, 48 ASIAN AFF. 529, 529-542
(2017); See also, W.K. FRASER-TYTLER, AFGHANISTAN: A STUDY OF POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ASIA 181-191 (2nd ed,. Oxford
Univ. Press 1953) (for additional information of the Pashtun Hill tribes’
history and customs).
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of sovereignty over them, and considered their tribal kinship
with the to be of considerable importance. 7
The Suleiman-koh range was poorly mapped in the
th
19 century and extremely inaccessible. Any external forces
who entered it, particularly those travelling in small numbers,
were highly vulnerable. The British perception that the
Pashtun Hill tribes were dangerous, hostile, difficult to
govern and reduce to obedience, and bent on predation of the
settled districts, continued to be one of the prime
considerations in whether to advance the area deemed to be
under direct British control further north-west.
Between 1849 to around the period of the Second AngloAfghan War (1878-1880), the British pursued a ‘close-border’
policy. They decided against any attempt to bring the
Suleiman-koh Mountains and the Pashtun Hill tribes under
their control or formal sovereignty. Instead, they attempted to
prevent the hill-tribes raiding the settled districts by building
fortifications, using locally-raised levies to repel attacks, and
by paying the tribes subsidies to ensure good behavior: for
example, to return fugitives, to restrain themselves from
raiding and to keep the roads open to travelers and trade
caravans. This approach was not especially successful, and
the British mounted 23 full-scale expeditions into the territory
of the Pashtun Hill tribes between 1857-1881 to chastise them
for raids or other infringements of the peace. 8
Around 1878, the close border policy began to change.
The British fear of increasing Russian encroachment in
Central Asia led to the argument that the frontier should be

See e.g. O. CAROE, THE PATHANS XI-XV, at 335-336, MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.
(1958).
8 Id. at 348-49.
7
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pushed up to the Hindu Kush, to include Kabul and
Kandahar as frontier cities: the so-called “forward policy”. In
1878, there was an effective attempt to put this policy into
practice. The British accused the Afghan King of
communicating with the Russian government, thus
endangering the security of India. The following dispute led
to the Second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1880). For a period,
the British attempted to dismember Afghanistan and retain
the areas south of the Hindu Kush but this was found to be
unviable, and the occupation was ended with a return of
troops and effective control to the base of the Suleiman-koh
range. However, in the aftermath of the war the British made
a treaty with the King of Afghanistan to take full control of
Afghan policy and foreign relations in return for an annual
subsidy, military assistance and a guarantee of security.
Despite the failure of the Second Afghan War, there
were calls for the limit of British control to be pushed into the
Suleiman-koh Mountains. Some officials argued that there
should be ‘peaceful penetration’ into the areas of the hill
tribes. Small areas of the tribal territory should be taken under
occupation and control and fortified, and that tribesmen
should be enlisted as members of irregular forces to keep the
peace. Such employment would, they argued, would lead to
economic development and greater pacification of the region.
This policy, known as the ‘Sandeman System’ had been
pursued with some success in the region of Baluchistan to the
south-west of the Pashtun territories. It was not formally put
into practice in the Pashtun regions after 1880, but there was
greater penetration of the regions during this period.
Following the Second Afghan War, British forces occupied the
Khyber Pass. By 1892, the British had established local
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outposts including the Samana Crest, the Southern Tirah, and
the Kurram Valley.9
These British advances, given the uncertainty of how
far an advance should be made into the tribal regions, gave
rise to a desire on the part of the British to make a firm
demarcation of the frontier between British India and
Afghanistan. This desire was supplemented by a continuing
fear of a Russian advance on India through the little-explored
region of the Wakhan and Pamirs. The British aspiration for a
frontier settlement with Kabul included the objective not only
of setting a frontier between British India and Afghanistan,
but also confirming Afghanistan’s own frontier with the
Russian Empire to the north, a frontier which still had not
been fully agreed or demarcated.
In October 1893 the Foreign Secretary of India, Sir
Mortimer Durand, travelled to Kabul to negotiate these
matters with Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Afghanistan. The
negotiations lasted a month, culminating in the signature of
two separate treaties between the Governments of British
India and Afghanistan on 12 November 1893, one of which
dealt with the Indo-Afghan frontier and the other of which
dealt with the Russo-Afghan frontier.10
The treaty which dealt with the Indo-Afghan frontier stated
in its preamble that the intention of the two governments in
signing it was to fix “the limit of their respective spheres of
influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of
opinion on the subject between the allied Governments…”. 11

Id. at 378-79.
See SIR PERCY SYKES, A HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN VOL. II, at 173-77
(1940).
11 Id. at 353.
9

10
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A map was attached to the treaty with a line (the Durand
Line) agreed by Durand and the Amir running from “the
Wakhan to the Persian border”. The treaty provided that “the
eastern and southern frontier of [the Amir’s] dominions”
should follow the line shown on the map (article 1). Article 2
provided that:
The Government of India will at no time
exercise interference in the territories lying
beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan,
and His Highness the Amir will at no time
exercise interference in the territories lying
beyond this line on the side of India.
Articles 3 and 5 clarify some of the points of the division of
territories and districts by the line. Article 4 provided that the
line would be demarcated on the ground by a joint
commission of British and Afghan officials, which should do
its best to follow the line as shown on the map attached to the
treaty, but that the commission should have “due regard to
the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier”.
Article 7 provided for annual financial and military subsidies
to be paid to the Afghan government in token of their
goodwill.
Article 6 provided that:
The above articles of agreement are regarded by
the Government of India and His Highness the
Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory
settlement of all the principal differences of
opinion which have arisen between them in
regard to the frontier…”
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In addition, any differences in detail about the line
should be referred to the boundary commission working on
the ground.
The second agreement signed on the same day
regarding the northern frontier of Afghanistan was
differently worded, making no mention of spheres of
influence. It describes its intention as the formation of “the
northern boundary of Afghanistan”.
The actual demarcation took place for the most part
between 1893-1896. Tensions caused by the presence of the
boundary commission in the hill areas led to a general
uprising which led to British reprisals in the years following
1897, known as the Malakand Campaign 12. Small sections
near Chitral and also in the Mohmand territories on the routes
to Kabul, on account of these difficulties, remained
undermarketed until the 1920s.
In 1904, the Punjab, which was the province of India
which predominantly faced the Afghan frontier was divided
at the order of the British Viceroy, Lord Curzon. A new
province made up of the areas closest to the frontier, named
the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP, recently
renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkwa) was created. There was a
return to the close border policy, but in the tribal districts in
the hills the Frontier Crimes Regulation was promulgated,
which remains in force today (for further discussion, see
below). Each of the tribal regions (known as agencies), then
five in number, were treated as quasi-autonomous but were
put under the responsibility of a British resident agent who

See generally Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force,
London (1898).

12
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answered directly to the Viceroy. During this period there
was a low level of practical penetration of the tribal areas,
thanks to the maintenance of the close border policy. The
British government stated that they had not assumed
sovereignty over the Tribal areas beyond the foothills but
viewed itself in the position of a suzerain power (see below). 13
The 1893 treaty regarding the Durand Line was
confirmed in a 1905 Anglo-Afghan treaty signed by Abdur
Rahman’s successor as ruler of Afghanistan, Amir
Habibullah.
In 1919, the Amir Habibullah was assassinated and
was succeeded by the Amir Amanullah. Amanullah,
motivated by radical elements hostile to the British, launched
an invasion of British India across the Durand Line. This
action led to the Third Anglo-Afghan War, which only lasted
for two months; it was swiftly brought to an end by the first
use of western air power against Afghanistan 14. In the Peace
Treaty which followed the end of the War, the Treaty of
Rawalpindi (8 August 1919), it was agreed that “The Afghan
Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the
late Amir.” (Article 5). A letter from the British Government
representative, Sir Hamilton Grant, to the Government of
Afghanistan following the signing of the Treaty, stated that
the Third Anglo-Afghan War “cancelled all previous
treaties”. The 1919 Treaty also returned control of Afghan
foreign policy to the Afghan government, making
Afghanistan fully independent in the conduct of its external
affairs.

13
14

See Caroe, supra note 8, at 413-420.
See Sykes, supra note 11, at 270-294.
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A more extensive treaty to regulate Anglo-Afghan
relations in the wake of Afghanistan’s independence was
signed between the two countries in 1921 (the Treaty of Kabul,
22 November 1921). Article 2 provided that “The two high
contracting parties mutually accept the Indo-Afghan frontier
as accepted by the Afghan Government under Article V of the
Treaty concluded on August 8, 1919...”. Also of relevance to
the frontier was article 11, which provided that each side
would “inform the other in future of any military operations
of major importance which may appear necessary for the
maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing
within their respective spheres, before the commencement of
such operations”. It is to be noted that the word “sphere”
rather than “territory” was used in this treaty.
The 1921 treaty, unlike those previous to it, provided a
repudiation clause (article 14):
The provisions of this treaty shall come into
force from the date of its signature, and shall
remain in force for three years from that date. In
case neither of the High Contracting Parties
should have notified twelve months before the
expiration of the said three years the intention
to terminate it, it shall remain binding until
expiration of one year from the day on which
either of the High Contracting Parties shall have
denounced it...
As a rider to the 1921 Treaty, the British Government
acknowledged in a note to the Government of Afghanistan
that the “conditions of the frontier tribes of the two
Governments are of interest to the Government of
Afghanistan”. However, there was no attempt to define in
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concrete terms the nature of this interest or how such an
interest should manifest itself in the rights and obligations of
either party to the treaty. As such, the interest as mentioned
in this rider remained inchoate.
In the 1920s and early 1930s, Afghanistan faced several
periods of instability, including the overthrow of Amanullah,
a civil war which saw the brief elevation of a non-Pashtun
(known as Bacha-i Saqao) to the Afghan throne, and the
assassination of Bacha-i Saqao’s royal Pashtun successor,
Nadir Shah. At this time, the Kabul government used its
influence with the Pashtun tribes on the Indian side of the
Durand line to enlist their support in the periods of internal
armed conflict which took place. Agents of the Kabul
government also agitated amongst the tribes on the Indian
side of the Durand Line to cause difficulties for the British
administration in India. The British returned to a forward
policy in the Pashtun tribal areas on their side of the Durand
Line with some attempts to increase penetration and
permanent control. However, these attempts were
unsuccessful. There were over 200 recorded raids from the
tribal areas during the 1930s, as well as a full-scale uprising
led by a charismatic religious leader, the Fakir of Ipi, which
led to the engagement of 32,000 regular troops from British
India. 15
In May 1930, an exchange of notes between the Afghan
Minister in London, His Highness General Shah Wali Khan,
and the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson,
confirmed that the 1921 Kabul Treaty continued to have full
force and effect.

15

Id. at 295-336.
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In 1944, following the British announcement of
impending Indian independence, the Afghan government
wrote to the Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, to request
discussions on the future of the Pashtun frontier tribes, with
a view to bringing them back under Afghan control and
sovereignty. The government of India refused to open
discussions, stating that Afghanistan should negotiate the
matter with the successor authority. 16
During the process of Indian partition, the settled parts
of the NWFP voted in a plebiscite to join Pakistan rather than
India. The turnout was low on account of a boycott; many
Pashtuns in the settled district were more sympathetic to the
Congress party than the Muslim league on account of local
political conditions. However, an absolute majority of the
population still voted to join Pakistan. In the tribal territories,
British officials held jirgas (traditional assemblies) with tribal
elders in which the frontier hill tribes were only offered the
option of establishing the same relationship of suzerainty
with Pakistan as they had previously had with the British
Crown. A number of these jirgas were only held in the months
after independence. 17
Afghanistan’s
initial
reaction
to
Pakistan’s
maintenance of the Durand Line and continuing claim of the
tribal lands on Pakistan’s side was mixed. The first
ambassador of Afghanistan to Pakistan stated that
Afghanistan had no claims on the frontier territory, and that
all claims to the contrary in the Afghan press should be

See generally Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, at 485-499, PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY PRESS (1973).
17 Dorothea S. Franck, Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land, 6 MIDDLE EAST
J. 49, 49-68 (1952).
16
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disregarded. Nevertheless, many Afghan media outlets called
for the restoration of the Pashtun tribal areas to Afghan
control, putting forward a vision of a return to a greater
Afghan empire similar to that which had existed during the
18th century. Some of these calls put forward the notion of
“Pashtunistan” – an independent homeland for the Pashtun
tribes on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line which would
be kept under Afghan protection.
The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan
quickly deteriorated after 1947. In 1948, Afghanistan voted
against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations on
account of its continuing control of the Tribal areas. In 1949,
following an inadvertent attack by Pakistan on the
Afghanistan in the Tribal areas, a loya jirga (grand tribal
council) was convened in Kabul which repudiated all frontier
treaties and gave support to the notion of Pashtunistan. It
made a formal call for a plebiscite in the frontier areas on the
now-Pakistani side to offer Pashtun the Pashtun tribes the
opportunity of joining a new entity of Pashtunistan.
Pakistan and Afghanistan both made a number of
incursions or staged interference across the Durand Line over
the following years. In 1949, Pakistan made an accidental
incursion across the Durand Line at Moughlai, one-and-a-half
miles into Afghan territory. Shortly afterwards, on 12 August
1949, groups of Pashtuns met on the Pakistan side of the line
at Tirah Bagh and Razmak to establish a Pashtunistan
assembly. In 1950 and 1951, there were incursions led by large
columns of irregular Afghan forces principally composed of
Pashtun tribesmen and under the leadership of Pashtun chiefs
across the Durand Line with the avowed intention of planting
a Pashtunistan flag on the Indus River. The Government of
Afghanistan denied any connection with the incursions, and
stated that they were freedom fighters. Pakistan retaliated by
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preventing or slowing imports across the line. In 1960, the
Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Sardar Mohammed Daoud
Khan, ordered several thousand troops dressed as tribesmen
to cross the Durand Line into the Tribal Agency of Bajaur on
the Pakistan side of the line, but the column was repelled by
the Bajauris. There were two further Afghan incursions in
1961, and Pashtuns on the Pakistan side were encouraged and
armed by Afghans to launch attacks on Pakistani military
units and blow up bridges. 18
In 1950, the British Foreign Secretary stated in the
House of Commons that it was the official view of the British
Government that the Durand Line was the boundary
demarcating the sovereign territories of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. 19
In 1955, the Establishment of West Pakistan Act was passed
to unify all the provinces which then made up West Pakistan
(it should be remembered that Bangladesh was then part of
Pakistan, known as “East Pakistan”). Under the Act, 2 (iv), the
Tribal Territories were formally integrated into West
Pakistan. Under Article 1(2) of the new 1956 Constitution of
Pakistan, which replaced the Government of India Act 1935
as the constitutional framework for Pakistan, all of West
Pakistan as defined in the West Pakistan Act 1955 was
declared to be a territory of Pakistan. The constitution makes
no distinction regarding sovereignty between the Tribal areas
on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line and any other part
of Pakistan. The special legal framework for the government
of the Tribal Territories (The Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901)
remained in force in the Tribal Territories. The West Pakistan

18
19

Dupree, supra note 17, at 538-40.
See Caroe, supra note 8, at 485.
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Act was rescinded in 1970 and the individual provinces
reinstated.
Pakistan maintained the framework of governance for
the Tribal territories left behind by the British, including the
hierarchy of Tribal Agents. From independence in 1947 to the
mid-1970s Pakistan kept its military presence in the Tribal
regions to a minimum. The Government of Pakistan assumed
responsibility for the development of the region, although the
level of development was extremely low (e.g. a $40,000
budget for the whole of FATA in 1971-2).
An attempted rapprochement between Afghanistan and
Pakistan in the mid-1970s intended to settle the dispute over
the Durand Line failed. From 1977, the President of Pakistan,
Zia ul-Haq, pursued a policy of Islamisation as a
counterweight to Pashtun nationalism. The Tribal areas were
used to radicalize and train Islamist fighters in isolation away
from the public gaze for use in attacking Indian interests in
Kashmir as well as with the intention of establishing influence
in Afghanistan. At this period Afghanistan was prey to
serious instability. Afghanistan suffered a coup in 1973 which
put an end to the monarchy, followed by a series of extreme
left-wing coups at the end of the decade which plunged the
country into chaos and encouraged the Soviet invasion of
1979. Pakistan harbored Islamist fighters in the Tribal areas
during this period, intending to use them to repel any attack
by the USSR, and also to establish Pakistani influence across
the Durand Line in southern Afghanistan. Pakistan
developed at this time a doctrine of “strategic depth”, which
held that in the event of any full-scale military conflict with
India, southern Afghanistan should be used as a strategic
hinterland and safe haven, and that Pakistan should project
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its influence there in order to secure the region for its
purpose. 20
The use of the Tribal territories by Pakistan for the
purpose of harboring militants to cross the frontier and
project influence on behalf of Pakistan continued throughout
the war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (19791989) the Afghan Civil War (1989-2001), notably with the
establishment of the Taliban, a Pakistani proxy intended to
govern southern Afghanistan, and also in the period
following the Allied invasion of Afghanistan (2001-date). It
should be noted that despite its Pakistani backing, the Taliban
government in Afghanistan refused to give any formal
recognition to the Durand Line.
Since 2001, Pakistan has waged a number of offensive
campaigns in the Tribal territories to attack a number of
radical Islamic militant groups which spiraled out of control
of the Pakistani intelligence community which had originally
cultivated them. The United States also has crossed the
Durand Line from the Afghan side to launch aerial military
attacks on militants on the Pakistani side of the line, often
without the consent or knowledge of the Government of
Pakistan. 21
Several reports have been made after 2001 of Pakistani
military forces moving the border pillars of the Durand Line
demarcation in certain areas and pushing the areas of

20 See generally Christian Wagner & Amina Khan, The Changing Character of
the Durand Line, 44 INTERNATIONALES ASIENFORUM 71 (2013).
21 See Amit Ranjan, Drone Attacks In Afghanistan And The Af-Pak Region: Is
There Any Other Option?, 45, J. OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y FOR ASIAN AFF. 456,
456-466 (2014).

2018

95

THE DURAND LINE

effective control a number of miles into Afghan territory. It is
difficult to verify these reports independently. 22
In March 2017, Pakistan approved a plan to
incorporate the Tribal territories fully into the province of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, removing the 1901 Frontier Crimes
Regulation and putting all inhabitants of the Tribal Territories
on the same legal-rights footing as other citizens of Pakistan.
This policy has been denounced by the Government of
Afghanistan, with a renewed statement that Afghanistan will
refuse to accept such an incorporation of the Tribal territories
into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and that Afghanistan still does
not accept the Durand Line as an international frontier. 23
II.

1893: POLITICAL AND LEGAL
DURAND LINE AND FATA

CONCEPTION

OF

THE

For an analysis of the legal conception of the Durand Line at
the time of its establishment in the late 19th century, it will be
useful to start with remarks made on the matter by officials in
the Government of India. These provide clear guidance on the
British understanding of the line at this period, and, in
addition to the black-letter text of the treaties and the
geographical circumstances, allow the Line to be put in the
international law context of the period.
Sir Mortimer Durand wrote after the negotiations that:

See SARAH CHAYES, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the
Taliban, at 132, LONDON: PENGUIN, (2006).
23 See Khattak, supra note 7, at 531-42 (explaining the structure and purpose
of FCR and the reaction to the reform).
22
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[. . .] the tribes on the Indian side are not to be
considered as within British territory. They are
simply under our influence in the technical
sense of the term, that is to say, so far as the
Amir is concerned and as far as they submit to
our influence or we exert it 24
Lord Elgin, Viceroy of India, wrote in 1896:
The Durand Line was an agreement to define
the respective spheres of influence of the British
Government and of the Amir. Its object was to
preserve and to obtain the Amir’s acceptance of
the status quo. 25
Sir Denis Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab,
wrote in a Government memorandum on the Durand Line in
1896 (a document which clearly purports to state the official
understanding of the Government of India):
I think it is of the highest importance that it
should simply be understood to be a line on
our side of which the Amir’s [Abdur
Rahman] interference except when we allow
him to chastise a tribe, shall be absolutely
excluded[. . .].I think if the agreement

G.W. Leitner, The Amir, the Frontier Tribes, and the Sultan, 4 IMPERIAL AND
ASIATIC Q. REV. AND ORIENTAL AND COLONIAL REC. 237 (1897) (Eng.).
25 Letter from Elgin, Priv. and Secret letter and enclosures received from
India, to Hamilton, 85 (1896) (on file with the Asia, Pac., and Afr.
Collections at the Brit. Libr.).
24
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between us and the Amir were treated to be
anything like a partition of territory, it
would have a bad effect, and although I see
it must practically involve something like a
partition of... the ‘Sphere of influence’ I think
it would be unwise to put it expressly that
way [. . .] 26
He went on to state that the intention of the British in
establishing the frontier was not to annex new territory or
increase the physical extent of British sovereignty, but to
“obviate the need for necessity for effective occupation as a
bar to annexation or encroachment by a competing state.”
Furthermore, the Government wished to avoid the
appearance of a partition of territory since it might “at some
points of the line, cast on us obligations of a very onerous
nature without any commensurate advantage; and 2nd,
because it might alarm the tribes and set them against us.”
The Tribal Areas, beyond the boundary of the settled districts,
was to be regarded as nothing more than a “possible
protectorate”. This area might, in the fullness of time, become
an area over which the British held full sovereignty, but this
would only be possible when “full and close control” could
be exercised by the Government of India over the whole
territory all the way up to the Indian side of the Line.
In 1907, Lord Curzon, who served as Viceroy of India
from 1899-1905, described the north-western frontier of India
as a “three-fold frontier” which comprised of:

See ‘Note by Sir Denis Fitzpatrick’ in IOR/PS/5265, p. 61, Asia, Paciﬁc
and Africa Collections British Library.
26
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“The administrative border of British India”, i.e. the
boundary between the settled districts of the plains
and the tribal districts of the foothills. Up to this
boundary on the settled side the ordinary laws of
British India were in force;
“The Durand Line, or frontier of active protection”;
“The Afghan Border [i.e. the northern border of
Afghanistan on the River Oxus] which is the outer
or advanced strategical frontier”.27

Taking these descriptions altogether, the following
characteristics can be attributed to the Line in the official
British understanding of it in the 1890s:
i.
The Durand Line was intended to demarcate the
spheres of influence of Afghanistan and British
India in the Pashtun tribal hill territories. It was not
such an arrangement as to go so far as being a
protectorate;
ii.
The Tribal hill territories themselves on the Indian
side of the line (FATA) were not seen as part of
British sovereign territory. These territories were
not governed by the normal laws of British India.
The British government exercised a suzerainty over
them by direct arrangements between the tribal
chiefs and the British Crown;
iii.
The British government had it in mind that they
might advance claims for sovereignty of the Tribal

27

George Nathanial Curzon, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Address at the
Romanes Lecture, (Nov. 2, 1907) in Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907, at 41.
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hill territories in time, but only when they were in
a position to control the area more fully;
This treatment of the Durand Line was consistent with
the contemporary trends of International Law regarding the
acquisition of territory. The notion of ‘spheres of influence’
can be traced back to agreements between Spain and Portugal
in the 15th century for the pursuit of colonizing activity in
Africa, but it found its modern definition and came into
vogue with the agreement between Great Britain and
Germany in May 1885 for defining the parties’ relative
‘spheres of action’. A number of agreements to delimit
spheres of influence in the race to acquire new colonial
territories were made between various powers following the
1885 agreement. The international jurist M.F. Lindley, writing
in 1926, divides these arrangements into four categories, of
which the Durand Agreement falls most comfortably into the
first, ‘Spheres of influence over large unorganized areas by
agreements between colonial powers’. 28 Although the third
category, ‘Spheres of Influence in the Territory of a single
State by direct agreement with its Sovereign’ might at first
sight seem more appropriate, the first is preferable in this
instance as the substance of the latter category appears to
have been an agreement not to alienate the territory in the
sphere of influence to any other party except the contracting
party; the 1893 agreement was about the exercise of influence.
Moreover, although Afghanistan maintained a claim of
sovereignty over the entire tribal hill territory, this was not
recognized by the British. The Afghan claim to sovereignty of

M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in
International Law, at 208, LONGMANS, GREENE & CO., LTD. (1969).
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the region had been weakened by the failure of the
government of Kabul to express any practical control or
exercise any of the functions of government in the Tribal hill
territories for a number of decades before 1893. Indeed,
sections of the hill territories had been conquered by the Sikh
Kingdom of the Punjab under Maharajah Ranjit Singh after
the 1820s and had been under Sikh administration until the
end of the Sikh Kingdom in 1849. Afghanistan, as a sovereign
power (though itself after 1880 under the protection of Britain
as regards its foreign policy), was therefore for all practical
purposes in the position of a colonial power attempting to
establish control of contiguous territories.
The obligations on the parties under such agreements
for the delimitation of spheres of influence, according to
Lindley, were not onerous. 29 Each party was obliged not to
interfere “where it has promised to leave the other a free
hand. The obligation is to abstain from political action which
might be regarded as a step towards the acquisition of
sovereignty.” Such agreements did not preclude either party
establishing commercial or trading interests in the other
party’s sphere. The agreement had no binding force on any
third power outside the affected area. The rights of native
sovereigns within the spheres of influence were not affected.
Any attempt by one of the parties to increase its power within
its sphere could be made by agreements with the native
sovereigns. The party could acquire legal title over the area of
influence by such agreements and the assumption of duties of
administration. In this way, states Lindley, “the shadowy
privileges pertaining to a sphere of influence have been
transformed into a title which is valid by International Law”.

29

Id. At 211.
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The black-letter text of the 1893 Durand treaty appears
to be thoroughly in accord with the contemporary
international law practice as described by Lindley, and
written with the other many recent agreements for the
delimitation of spheres of influence in mind. As such, it seems
safe to conclude that this was the intention certainly of the
British in signing the 1893 treaty, and the treaty should be
understood as one providing for the delimitation of spheres
of influence.
As there was no substantive change in the British practice of
administering FATA between the 1893 Treaty and Indian
independence in 1947, it is submitted that the inchoate
possibility of British sovereignty over FATA never hardened
into legal title.
III.

POSITION OF PAKISTAN REGARDING THE DURAND LINE
AND FATA SOVEREIGNTY

The official position of Pakistan regarding the status of
the Durand Line and FATA is that FATA forms a part of the
sovereign territory of Afghanistan, and that the Durand Line
is the international boundary which divides the sovereign
territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This position is
expressed in the Constitution of Pakistan. 30
IV.

30

POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN REGARDING THE DURAND
LINE AND FATA, AND THE OBJECTIONS TO THE POSITION
OF PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. c.
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The official position of Afghanistan regarding the
Durand Line is that Afghanistan does not recognize the
Durand Line as an international boundary. Afghanistan’s
claims regarding the territory of FATA have been various and
not clearly articulated, but they do not accept that Pakistan
has a right to possess the territories. 31
The objections which have been or could be made by
Afghanistan to the position of Pakistan recognizing the
Durand Line as an international boundary demarcating the
sovereign territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan are as
follows:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

31

That the original treaties between the Governments
of India and Afghanistan did not intend a division
of sovereignty between the two powers;
That the agreement was capable of repudiation
under the terms of the 1921 Treaty, and that
Afghanistan had invoked this clause in 1949;
That under the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus the
treaties establishing the Durand Line were
invalidated by the Independence of India;
That the state practice of Pakistan and Afghanistan
over the course of time has prevented the Durand
Line from acquiring the status of an international

See M. HASSAN KAKAR, A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF
AFGHANISTAN 1863-1901, BRILL, (2006) (summarizing the Afghan position
and interpretation of history); see also Naveed Siddiqui, Afghanistan Will
Never Recognise the Durand Line: Hamid Karzai, DAWN (updated Mar. 5,
2017), https://www.dawn.com/news/1318594.
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boundary demarcating sovereign territories
(estoppel);
That the tribes on the Pakistan side of the line were
not given a full right of self-determination by being
offered the right to join Afghanistan at the time of
Indian independence in 1947;
That the 1893 treaty was obtained under duress and
that it was thereby invalid;
That the 1893 treaty was not properly ratified by the
Government of Afghanistan;
That Pakistan is not a successor state to British
India, and thus not an inheritor of the rights and
obligations imposed by earlier treaties made by
British India.

DISCUSSION OF AFGHAN OBJECTIONS
a. INTENTION OF TREATIES

Afghanistan has objected to the position that the
Durand Line is a sovereign boundary on the grounds that it
never consented in any of the treaties for the Line to assume
such a status. Afghanistan contends that the original 1893
Treaty was not intended to divide sovereignty over the
region, but was rather to divide spheres of influence. The
arrangement was not to be viewed as permanently fixed. The
contrast in language between the 1893 treaties dealing with
the northern boundaries of Afghanistan and the Durand Line
(see below) should be viewed as indicative of their different
natures. Afghanistan also contends that the successive treaties
and exchanges of letters touching on the matter of the Durand
Line did not alter the position as regarding the nature of the
line or indicate any assent on the part of Afghanistan towards
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the Line developing into an international sovereign
boundary.
Afghanistan has a convincing case for claiming that
there was never any consent for the Durand Line to be an
international sovereign boundary. However, despite the
absence of Afghan consent, the circumstances are such that a
claim by Pakistan on the grounds of effective possession
could overcome any case by Afghanistan based on an
argument of entitlement through original lack of consent (see
below).
b. TREATY CAPABLE OF REPUDIATION
As stated above, the 1921 Treaty, unlike those before it,
had a repudiation clause (article 14). This provided for the
termination of the treaty one year after either party gave
notice, and that no other conditions were required for the
clause to be triggered. Afghanistan contends that the
repudiation clause of the treaty was invoked by the
declaration of the Loya Jirga in 1949 and hence that under the
terms of the treaty the repudiation came into effect in 1950.
Afghanistan would be able to contend that if the nature
of the Durand Line was that of a sphere of influence rather
than that which was intended to divide sovereign territories,
then it would be able to obviate the rule regarding “executed
clauses”. Treaty clauses which are intended to demarcate
sovereign boundaries are regarded as having been
“executed” on the ratification of the treaty. When the division
of territory has been “executed”, the work of the clauses has
been completed and they cannot be repudiated or revoked.
The treaty clauses are equivalent to title deeds in a
conveyance, which once they have been enacted have no force
other than to memorialize the transfer of the relevant
property. In this case, since the treaty did not intend a
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sovereign boundary to be created, the clauses had not been
executed but were in fact “executory”. They had a contractual
force which placed a continuing obligation on the parties, not
to interfere in the sphere of influence of the other party. As
such, Afghanistan may contend that the clause was capable of
extinction on the repudiation of the treaty.32
However, although Afghanistan may validly be able to
contend that the 1921 treaty and the clause concerning the
Durand Line had been repudiated, the response to this
objection is the same as that to that regarding the original
intention of the treaties above. A claim by Pakistan based on
effective possession also overcomes this objection.
VI.

REBUS SIC STANTIBUS

Afghanistan may attempt to rely on the doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus to argue that the sections of the 1921 treaty
providing for the maintenance of the Durand Line should be
invalidated on the grounds that the fundamental
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty – i.e.
India as one entity under British rule – had come to an end
with Indian independence in 1947 and the partition of British
India into the then Dominions of India and Pakistan. It should
be noted that the dissolution of the direct agreements between
the Pashtun Chiefs and the British crown at the moment of
Indian independence also generated a period when the
Pashtun tribes on the Pakistani side were de jure independent
and without any allegiance to Pakistan, until they re-

See Letter from Sir Dan Lascelles, British Ambassador to Afghanistan, to
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1950) (raising his concerns over this
possibility).
32
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established similar connections with the Government of
Pakistan over the months following Indian independence. 33
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is well recognized in
international law. It was accepted as an article of the Vienna
Convention of the Law of Treaties in 1969, but before that in
the relevant period, that is 1947, the doctrine was already still
recognized as valid by international jurists.
However, at the time of Indian independence, as
Oppenheim notes “in almost all cases in which the doctrine…
has been invoked before an international tribunal, the latter,
while not rejecting it as a principle, has refused to admit that
it could be applied to the case before it”. 34 The bar to
admitting a claim based on rebus sic stantibus is high on the
grounds that “it is a function of the law to enforce contracts
or treaties even if they become burdensome for the party
bound by them.” Hence, jurists are reluctant to allow rebus sic
stantibus to be a get-out clause for a treaty obligation which
has become onerous.
The use of the doctrine would be complicated since at
the relevant time, particularly on account of the scarcity of
international case law, there was no agreed test for invoking
the doctrine. Rebus sic stantibus was invoked without success
by the claimant in Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of
Gex 35. The court at various times articulated the doctrine as
being applicable “when the situations have so changed that
the reason which caused the rules to be imposed no longer

See Franck, supra note 18, at 61.
LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTS 2 TO 4,
1307, Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. (1992).
35 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1929 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 22, at 5 (Aug. 19).
33
34
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exists”, and later that there had to have been “an essential
change in the circumstances for which the treaty has been
concluded”.
The 1928 supplement to the American Journal of International
Law offered three alternative approaches to the doctrine. The
first posits that a treaty continues in force when “a relation
between the binding force of the treaty and a continuance of
a state of facts [remains] essentially unchanged because the
parties intended that the continuance of the state of facts
should be a condition of the binding force of the treaty”. The
second looks not to the intention of the parties, but whether
the changes complained of are “essential”, “fundamental”, or
“vital”. L.H. Woolsey discussed what could be described as
vital in these circumstances:
Changes which are regarded by authorities as
fundamental or vital are those which: take away
the very foundation of the engagement, that is,
its raison d'etre; threaten or cause the sacrifice
of a state's development or its vital
requirements for political or economic existence
to the execution of the treaty, that is, make
performance impracticable except at an
unreasonable sacrifice; are inconsistent with the
right of self-preservation, or incompatible with
the independence of the state; modify
essentially the political relations which
produced political treaties, as for example
treaties of alliance; make a treaty really
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The third approach would be that the doctrine could
be invoked it “a change in the state of facts would be so
injurious to one of the parties that such party has a right under
the law or right of necessity to terminate the treaty.”
The high bar to the invocation of the doctrine means that
regardless of which test would be applicable, it is unlikely
that Afghanistan could successfully invoke it. As regards the
first approach, although it is unlikely in 1921 that Indian
independence and partition would have been envisaged by
either party, with Independence and partition there had not
been any essential change in the geographical, ethnographical
or security situation of the Tribal Areas. A successor to British
India had emerged in the region, but the successor, Pakistan,
had the same security concerns and moved quickly to
reconstitute and reaffirm the relationship which the British
Crown had with the Tribal areas. As such, there had not been
any essential change. As regards the second approach, the reacquisition of the Tribal territories with the independence of
Pakistan could by no means be seen as vital for the
continuance of Afghanistan or its political or economic
continuance. As for the third test, likewise, the failure to reacquire the Tribal territories with the new circumstances of
the emergence of Pakistan cannot be seen as so injurious that
the treaty should have been terminated. Although, touching
on the second and third tests, Pakistan’s use of the territories
to unsettle Afghanistan from the 1970s did injure

L.H. Woolsey, The Unilateral Termination of Treaties, 20 AM. J. INT. LAW,
346, 349-350 (1926).
36
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Afghanistan. However, it was not the loss of the territories in
themselves which caused the injury, but Pakistan’s behavior
towards Afghanistan, which could have been pursued
regardless of whether Afghanistan possessed the territories or
not.
It should be noted that the change of circumstances in
itself does not give a party a right unilaterally to withdraw
from a treaty, but that the party should make representations
to the other party that the obligations of the treaty should be
changed, and that if this is turned down there should be an
application to the court to have the terms varied. The refusal
to submit the matter to adjudication is taken as prima facie
evidence that the doctrine is being invoked as a cover for an
intended breach of the law 37. The failure of Afghanistan to
make the point to Pakistan or any tribunal soon after 1947
may invalidate it, and also count against the notion that its
failure to regain the tribal territories were inconsistent with
Afghanistan’s self-preservation.
Any appeal to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is likely
to be overcome by the doctrine of uti possidetis if pleaded by
Pakistan (see below).
VII.

STATE PRACTICE – ESTOPPEL

Afghanistan may attempt to argue that the conduct of
Pakistan following 1947, in particular its frequent failure to
adhere to the requirement of the treaties not to interfere with
the territories on the Afghan side of the Durand Line,
invalidates the Durand Line as an international sovereign
boundary, or has at least prevented the frontier from

37

OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 539.
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hardening into such a boundary from a line demarcating
spheres of influence. Pakistan, by its conduct, has failed to
treat the Durand Line as an international sovereign boundary,
and hence it cannot have acquired such a status in practice.
Such an argument would essentially be that of an estoppel
raised by Afghanistan against Pakistan based on its state
practice.
The leading case from the International Court of Justice on the
use of estoppel in territorial claims is the Temple of Preah Vihear
Case 38. It is important to note in the first instance that the
language of the Temple case suggests that the estoppel is a
procedural doctrine rather than a substantive doctrine. It does
not generate any rights on the part of the claimant, but can
only serve as a defense to a claim. Thus, if Afghanistan were
to bring a claim it would not be able to plead the argument as
part of its claim. However, if Pakistan were to bring a case
seeking a declaration of the status of the Durand Line as the
international sovereign boundary then Afghanistan would be
able to raise the estoppel in defense against Pakistan’s claim.
In principal, there are three elements for the assertion of an
estoppel: first, the statement creating the estoppel must be
clear and unambiguous; second, the statement must be
voluntary, unconditional and authorized; third, the party
claiming an estoppel must have relied in good faith on the
statement of the other party, either to their own detriment or
else the advantage of the other party. Applying these
elements derived from the Temple case to the dispute between

Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J. REP. 6 (June
15); see also Sally Tyler, Of Temples and Territory: The ICJ's Preah Vihear
Decision and Implications for Regional Dispute Resolution, 19 U. D.C. L. REV.
133, 147–48 (2016).
38
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Afghanistan and Pakistan, Afghanistan would have to show
that the conduct of Pakistan in its transgressions of the
Durand Line had to be directly related to the question of
territorial possession, that it was attributable to the state of
Pakistan, that it had to be sufficiently consistent and of a
sufficiently long duration to be able to give rise to legitimate
expectations on the part of Afghanistan that Pakistan no
longer sustained its position that the Durand Line was an
international sovereign boundary. Afghanistan would also
have to show that to frustrate these expectations would create
an unjustifiable detriment to itself or an unjustifiable benefit
to Pakistan.
Aside from Pakistan’s brief incursion across the
Durand Line in 1949, the conduct in disregard of the line
began in the mid-1970s following the coup against the
monarchy in 1973. There is no doubt that following this
period, from the presidency of Zia ul-Haq onwards, Pakistan
has attempted to project its influence beyond the Durand Line
into southern and eastern Afghanistan in particular.
However, aside from the reports after 2001 of frontier posts
being moved several miles forward on certain spots along the
Durand Line (see above) Pakistan’s conduct has not been
aimed at the outright possession of territory beyond the
Durand Line, but only the projection of influence. As such, the
assertion of estoppel appears to fail, since the conduct of
Pakistan in this regard is not related to territorial possession,
and Pakistan has not conceded any territory on its side of the
Durand Line in its own conduct. It is also questionable as to
whether there was any clear and unambiguous statement on
the part of Pakistan that it no longer recognized the line as the
international boundary. Its own official statements asserted
the Durand Line as being the international boundary
throughout the period, despite its conduct of projecting
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power beyond the line, most often by the assistance of
militants and other proxies. Moreover, it may also be difficult
to attribute the conduct of the militants which interfered in
Afghanistan from behind the Pakistani side of the line to the
Government of Pakistan. Although in some periods, notably
in the mid-1990s with the period of Taliban rule, Pakistan
actively assisted militants to take power in Afghanistan, in
more recent years the militants have behaved as non-state
actors out of the control of the Government of Pakistan, and
have launched attacks on Afghanistan on their own volition.
On top of this, it would be difficult for Afghanistan to show
that it had acted on the conduct of Pakistan to its own
detriment. With all of these arguments taken together, it
would be difficult for Afghanistan to raise the estoppel.
VIII.

SELF-DETERMINATION

It has been a complaint of the Government of
Afghanistan that the Pashtun tribal peoples, not just those in
FATA but also those of the North Western Frontier Province
in 1947 were not given the option of opting for union with
Afghanistan or of forming an independent nation of
“Pashtunistan”. In the Tribal hill territories, there were no
secret ballots or attempts at international oversight.
Afghanistan argues on this ground that it was illegitimate for
Pakistan to retain the Tribal territories and areas inhabited by
Pashtuns, since they were denied the full right to selfdetermination.
However, at the time of the partition there was no
established law on how the right of self-determination should
be exercised in practice. The first legal rules that directly dealt
with this issue began to be crystallized in the 1950s, and in the
form in which these rules were finally articulated – the text of
the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 1541 (XV) (1960) – the
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rules only applied to the administering power (‘colonial
master’) and the basic requirement was that the administering
power had to organize some form of a plebiscite in which the
colonial people would be given a choice of three options: go
independent (have their own state), merge with another
state/people, or remain part of the colonial empire. There
were no other substantively relevant requirements. Since this
was not a recognized requirement under international law at
the time of Indian independence in 1947, the limited access of
the Pashtun peoples to self-determination cannot call into
question the legality of Pakistan’s control over the Tribal
areas. Moreover, as with rebus sic stantibus, the international
law doctrine of uti possidetis stands powerfully in the way of
any right to self-determination for peoples next to colonial
borders during this period in history.
IX.

1893 TREATY OBTAINED UNDER DURESS

It has been a complaint of Afghanistan that the 1893
treaty was obtained under duress. Britain, argues
Afghanistan had recently invaded Afghanistan. It had also
taken control of the country’s foreign relations, and was
giving the country military assistance and financial subsidies
on which the Amir of Afghanistan was dependent for his
power. As such, there was a degree of duress or level of
inequality between the parties which rendered the 1893 treaty
invalid.
On the question of fact, it would be difficult to show
that there was a high degree of coercion in the negotiation of
the 1893 treaty. The negotiations lasted a month, and a stream
of correspondence between Sir Mortimer Durand and the
Government of India shows that there was a genuine process
of negotiation over this period: the British conceded to the
Government of Afghanistan that a number of areas should fall
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on the Afghan side of the Durand Line which they had
originally wished to fall on the Indian side. Contemporary
accounts suggest that, even if Abdur Rahman had mixed
feelings about the agreement, his assent was not brought
about by duress. 39
In legal terms, even if there had been coercion as
regarding the state of Afghanistan, international law of the
time did not recognize a treaty as being invalid on this
account. As Oppenheim observes, coercion in the signing of
peace treaties “was a necessary corollary of the admissibility
of war as an instrument for changing the existing law.” 40
On top of this, the validity of the 1893 treaty is a moot
point in this regard, as it was finally superseded by the 1921
treaty. This having been concluded when Afghanistan was
independent, and when Afghanistan was pursuing treaties on
its own account with other powers having freed itself from
British control of its foreign relations in the 1919 Third AngloAfghan War (which was initiated by Afghanistan), cannot be
seen as a treaty obtained under duress.
X.

1893 TREATY NOT PROPERLY RATIFIED BY AFGHANISTAN

Sultan Mohamed Khan, The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan
146, Munshi Sultan ed.,
vol. II (1900) (“At the same time when I was occupied in breaking down
the feudal system of Afghanistan and molding the country into a strong
consolidated kingdom, I was not unaware nor neglectful of the necessity
of deﬁning my boundaries with the neighboring countries. I well knew
that it was necessary to mark out the boundary lines between my
dominions and those of my neighbors, for the safety and protection of my
kingdom, and for the purpose of putting a check on their advances, and
getting rid of misunderstandings and disputes.”).
40 OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 499.
39
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Some commentators have said that the 1893 treaty
should be regarded as invalid on the grounds that it was not
properly ratified. They argue that as the ruler of Afghanistan,
the Amir Abdur Rahman, approved it unilaterally and did
not offer a proper discussion or free vote on the matter in the
legislature, the 1893 treaty should be regarded as void.
This objection, however, is founded on an
anachronism. On Abdur Rahman’s accession to power in 1880
following the Second Anglo-Afghan War, he re-established
the monarchy as being absolute. The contemporary
constitutional theory, approved by religious scholars in
Afghanistan, was that the power of the Amir was derived
from God (Allah) and that he was the final arbiter in wielding
executive, legislative and judicial power, as well as in
determining matters of religious doctrine. He was not, as had
previously been the case, fettered by any traditional Afghan
tribal authorities or customs. As such, he had an absolute
right to negotiate and conclude treaties on behalf of the state
of Afghanistan.
Even if it were the case that he did not have such a
right, as Oppenheim states, if a treaty “has been entered into
in disregard of the limitations of [a state’s] constitutional law
and practice, that State must be deemed to have waived its
right to assert the invalidity of the treaty if for a prolonged
period it has failed to do so, or if it has acted upon it, or has
obtained advantage from it.”41 Afghanistan, having
reaffirmed the treaty under Habibullah in 1905 as well as
Amanullah in 1919 and 1921 (see above), must be seen as
having waived its right to assert that the treaty is void.

41

OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 497.
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Besides this, the validity of the 1921 treaty has not been called
into question in this fashion.
XI.

PAKISTAN A SUCCESSOR STATE TO BRITISH INDIA

Afghanistan has argued that Pakistan is not a valid
successor state to British India, and as such the treaties made
between Afghanistan and the former British authorities are
void.
However, this position is not accepted by the rest of the
international community. It was agreed between India and
Pakistan in 1947 that British India’s treaty rights and
obligations “having… exclusive territorial application” to
either the new India or new Pakistan would devolve upon the
new individual countries alone. 42 In 1949, it was stated by
the British Government that “Pakistan is in international law
the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government
of India and of His Majesty’s Government of the United
Kingdom in these territories.” In 1956, all members of the
South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) recognized
Pakistan as the inheritor of British India’s treaty rights and
obligations as regards the exclusive territory of Pakistan.
In view of the substantial body of legal scholarship on
this point, not to mention the view of the international
community and state practice, it is unlikely to be accepted that
the 1921 Treaty is voided on account of Pakistan’s succession
to British India.

42

Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Judgement, 2000 I.C.J. 12 (June 21).
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a. PAKISTAN’S CASE FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE DURAND
LINE AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER FATA
Pakistan’s case for the Durand Line being a valid
international boundary line and possessing sovereignty over
FATA is likely to consist in the following arguments:
i.
Effective possession of the territories by
occupation or prescription;
ii.
The application of uti possidetis;
iii.
The state practice of Afghanistan since 1947
(estoppel).
iv.
b. DISCUSSION OF PAKISTAN’S CASE
i. EFFECTIVE POSSESSION
It is a principle of international law that effective
possession of a territory rather than any nominal entitlement
is the main factor that counts in determining questions of
sovereignty (ex facto ius oritur).
The Island of Palmas case (1928) 43 established the basic
rule that “a continuous and peaceful possession” of a piece of
territory, “manifested in the actual display of state activities”
will generally override every other claim to the same territory
whatever may be its basis. The current exceptions to the rule
are the prohibition of annexations (acquisition of title by
conquest) and the prohibition of any other acquisition carried
out in violation of the principle of self-determination. The
former is not applicable in this case, as the division and

Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), (U.S v Nds.), Judgment, (1928) II RIAA
829.

43
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occupation of the territory took place by treaty rather than by
the illegal use of force. The latter, as stated above only became
applicable in the 1960s with the development of a doctrine of
self-determination in international law.
According to the Clipperton Island case (1931) 44, the
meaning of “effective possession” is that the state in question
has to display a convincing animus occupandi, and also has to
take steps to exercise “exclusive authority” within the
relevant territory, which “strictly speaking, and in ordinary
cases [can] only take… place when the state establishes in the
territory itself an organization capable of making its laws
respected”.
In the Minquiers and Erechos case (1953) 45, the decisive
factors in the Court’s decision related to the administration of
law enforcement, including the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction, the holding of inquests, and the collection of
taxes. In this case, the administration of these functions by
Jersey pointed to British sovereignty over the territory,
ousting a French claim based on ownership of the territory by
the Duchy of Normandy in the 11th century and the use of the
territorial waters by the French fishing fleet.
During the time of British rule, as expressed in the
statements made by British officials (see above) the
Government of India had no animus occupandi as regards
FATA. However, it arguably did have a sufficient presence in
the region to exercise an exclusive authority, the second limb
of the requirement for sovereignty. The circumstances
regarding FATA, particularly the customs and beliefs of
many of the Pashtuns as to an acceptable government and

44
45

Clipperton Island Case, (Fr. v. Mex.), Judgment, (1931) 2 RIAA 1105.
Minquiers and Erechos (Fr. v. U.K.), Judgment, 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17).
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way of life were singular, such that what would have been
seen as a desirable government which safeguarded the life
and liberty of the subject in the settled areas would have been
seen as unacceptable in FATA. With this in mind, the British
administration exercised such organs of government in FATA
as could practically have been established and maintained
during the period.
The position is complicated by the fact that FATA
territory was divided into two classes: administered and
unadministered. The former was garrisoned and protected by
military forces and levies, and subject to the FCR. As
mentioned above, the latter was left to Pashtun tribal
jurisdiction. However, throughout the time of British rule, all
parts of the Tribal territories, administered and
unadministered, were subject to military incursions and
periodic occupation. Moreover, the British authorities would
make arrangements with the chiefs as regarding specific
matters and requirements from time to time in the
unadministered districts. Such a presence, suggests
Oppenheim, is sufficient for the expression of effective control
in distant areas. 46 Thus, it could be argued that the British
Government of India had, by the time of partition, satisfied
the test of effective control, although not possessing animus.
Pakistan continued the British regime in FATA, such
that it also satisfied the test of effective control. However,
Pakistan not only satisfied the test of effective control, but also
the requirement for animus. Such is certainly clear from the
statement made by the British Government at the prompting
of Pakistan in 1950 that the Durand Line should be regarded
as the international sovereign boundary, as well as the 1954

46

OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 560.
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West Pakistan Act and the 1955 Constitution of Pakistan. The
decision made by the Government of Pakistan in March 2017
to abolish the special status of FATA and to incorporate FATA
into the mainstream territory of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on the
same basis as any other part of ordinary Pakistani territory
puts the point beyond any doubt in the contemporary sphere.
Thus, Pakistan appears to have fulfilled the
requirements for FATA to be under its effective possession. It
can be argued, depending on whether the tribal organization
of the territory in the mid-20th century was sufficiently
definite, that Pakistan has effective possession of the territory
either by occupation, or else if the tribes had a sufficient level
of organization to be capable such that the land should not
have been seen as terra nullius, that Pakistan took it by right
of prescription, where an acquiescence to the effective control
of Pakistan over a prolonged period made good Pakistan’s
claim to sovereignty. Possession by occupation or
prescription would also overcome any claim based on
nominal entitlement by Afghanistan.
XII.

THE APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS

The doctrine of uti possidetis was developed in the 19th
century to deal with the decolonization of Latin America. It
provided that the boundaries as fixed at the time of
decolonization should be preserved in order to prevent
further conflict as colonizing powers departed.
In Burkina Faso v Mali 47 it was held that the principle of
uti possidetis was of general application, “logically connected

Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali.), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 ¶
20 (Dec. 22).
47
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with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence
wherever it occurs.” The principle was not restricted just to
ordinary international boundaries: “The territorial
boundaries which have to be respected may also derive from
international frontiers which previously divided a colony of
one State from a colony of another, or indeed a colonial
territory from the territory of an independent State, or one
which was under protectorate, but had retained its
international personality” 48. Given the wide application of the
principle, and its expressed intention of “securing respect for
the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence
is achieved” 49 to prevent “fratricidal struggles provoked by
the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the
administering power” 50, it is submitted that the principle is
applicable to the Durand Line, even if at 1947 it still in legal
terms was intended only to demarcate a sphere of influence.
Burkina Faso v Mali also provides that uti possidetis was
not overridden by any claims to self-determination.
Whenever the two were in conflict, uti possidetis prevailed.
This was also confirmed in 1992 by the EC Commission for
Yugoslavia (the Badinter Commission). In its Opinion No. 2 it
extended the same reasoning beyond the colonial context: “it
is well established that, whatever the circumstances, the right
to self-determination must not involve changes to existing
frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris)
except where the States concerned agree otherwise”.
As such, the doctrine as the effect of preserving the
Durand Line as constituted in 1947 and overrides any

Id. at ¶ 24.
Id. at ¶ 23.
50 Id. at ¶ 22.
48
49
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objection which may be had on the grounds of selfdetermination.
XIII.

THE STATE PRACTICE OF AFGHANISTAN (ESTOPPEL)

The doctrine of estoppel has already been discussed
above in regard of Afghanistan’s objections to the Durand
Line. Likewise, it should be remembered that Pakistan could
not use the doctrine in any positive case, but it would be a
defense against any action that Afghanistan might bring
against it.
Pakistan may cogently argue that Afghanistan should be
estopped from bringing any action against it in regard of the
Durand Line and FATA on account of its inconsistent
behavior and statements over a long period of time. In 1947,
as stated above, the Afghan government declared that it had
no claims over the tribal areas. However, in 1949 this position
was changed to a repudiation of the clauses of the treaties
establishing the Durand Line. Although this repudiation has
been maintained, there has been no consistent statement of
position from the Government of Afghanistan regarding its
position on the status of the FATA. The calls made by the
Afghan Government or official media have ranged from
seeking to incorporate territory as extensive as Balochistan
and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa into Afghanistan, to calls for these
areas merely to have referendums for self-determination and
the possibility of independence or incorporation into
Afghanistan, to calls for just FATA to be incorporated into
Afghanistan. As such, given the inconsistency of the Afghan
position over a long period of time, such an estoppel would
have a good chance of success.
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CONCLUSIONS

Afghanistan may put forward a number of arguments
against the Durand Line as it is currently constituted based on
the original intention of the frontier treaties and the
circumstances in which they came to be made. However,
under the terms of customary international law it appears that
Pakistan, by means of its long-standing effective possession
of FATA and the operation of the doctrine of uti possidetis, has
a stronger case by far for sovereignty over FATA and for
maintaining that the Durand Line should be seen as the
international sovereign boundary between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
However, although an international law analysis of the
problem may reach a simple and clear solution, it is not
necessarily one which is satisfactory in the long-term
politically, diplomatically or for international security. It is
understandable that Afghanistan may continue to foster a
grievance over the tribal regions, particularly given that it
gave no active assent to a partition of sovereignty, that the
British Government acknowledged an undefined Afghan
“interest” in the tribes on the Indian side of the Durand Line,
that the Afghan Government had no genuine opportunity to
renegotiate the frontier at the time of Indian independence,
and that the operation of uti possidetis and the lack of force in
the doctrine of self-determination worked against
Afghanistan at the time of Indian independence also. 51 The
current configuration of the border has proved, on account of
geography and ethnography, difficult to govern and
inherently unstable. It has encouraged interference both ways

51

Mahmud, supra note 2, at 29 n.147.
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across the frontier, not to mention encouraging Afghanistan
to fall into the Soviet sphere in the 1960s, the first step to the
war of the 1980s. It has given rise to the problems of drone
strikes and “hot pursuit” in the last decade. 52
A better solution to the problem of the Durand Line
would not consist of the parties standing on their rights under
international law or looking to a strict division of sovereignty,
but to a regime of co-operation across the frontier so that the
Pashtun Hill tribes on both the Afghan and Pakistan side of
the Durand Line could be governed coherently as a single
entity for their own benefit. Such cross-border co-operation
could be granted in return for an acknowledgement by
Afghanistan of Pakistan’s formal sovereignty. The
arrangement would benefit not only Afghanistan and
Pakistan by removing one of the greatest stumbling blocks to
good diplomatic relations between the two countries, but also
the international community by allowing the establishment of
a coherent approach to development and security.
A settlement of the Durand Line problem might also
assist Pakistan in coming to a settlement of the Kashmir
conflict with India. Were Pakistan to feel less threatened on
account of its border with Afghanistan, it might give it the
confidence to make peace with India on its eastern frontier. It
should be noted that such an arrangement was suggested by
the US State department in the 1930s and again in the 1950s,
but officials did not persist with the idea. Beyond this, a
pooling of sovereignty or a cross-border arrangement would
be more suited to the history and traditions of the region,
where frontiers traditionally have been fluid and porous, and
the Westphalian vision of frontiers and the nation state is a

52

Ranjan, supra 22, at 457.
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recent import which does not sit easily with the history and
realities of the locale.
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